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Abstract 
 
 
Europe‟s pensions landscape has changed dramatically since the 1990s. This paper tries to 
assess better the impact of these changes using a broad social sustainability framework. 
Pension wealth estimates for a variety of hypothetical cases are used to assess the ability 
of systems to alleviate poverty and maintain living standards, while setting out how 
reforms could change future costs and relative entitlements for different generations.  
 
By focusing on all prospective transfers rather than those at retirement and by looking into 
the interaction between entitlements and labour participation, this approach provides 
additional insights on the impact of reforms. Our estimates suggest that generosity has 
fallen significantly, but remains strong in many countries. However, moves to link benefits 
to contributions have raised adequacy concerns for certain groups and strengthened the 
need for longer careers. Though reforms have helped address fiscal challenges, in many 
countries pressures remain strong and further reforms are likely. 
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Introduction 
 
Spurred by the ageing transition, many governments have carried out wide-ranging reforms, 
changing the public pensions landscape in Europe dramatically since the early 1990s.  
Nevertheless concerns about future costs remain at the top of the agenda of most EU finance 
ministers despite that public resistance to reforms remains strong.     
 Most reforms appear to have been driven by a limited concept of sustainability, 
conceived as reducing projected levels of future spending on state pensions, through cuts in 
generosity.
1
 However, given the growing size of the pensioner population, there is an 
increasing risk that if the pension system does not fulfil public expectations, and/or older 
people find that they did not make appropriate saving and working decisions, the state could 
be forced by voters to reverse reforms and spend more on social transfers.
2
 Rather than 
focusing only on the effect of reforms on projected spending on pensions, assessments of the 
sustainability of reforms should also attempt to understand the implications on pension 
adequacy, particularly on the entitlements of those groups that are less able to accommodate 
the effects of benefit cuts through behavioural changes.
3
 The social sustainability of reforms 
depends crucially on their impact on the pension system‟s ability to reduce poverty and 
replace pre-retirement income and also on the ability of individuals to change their work and 
saving behaviour to accommodate the reforms. This broader analysis is increasingly featuring 
in assessments of pension reforms.
4
 
 This paper will try to build on this literature by presenting evidence on reforms 
carried out since the 1990s in ten European countries, representative of the different pension 
system designs across the continent. In doing so, it will also focus attention on two issues. 
Many assessments of pension generosity focus on the level of pension entitlements at the 
point of retirement for men with a full career on average earnings. For example, the EU‟s 
main pensions adequacy indicator (see EU Commission (2012)) is “the level of pension 
income the first year after retirement as a percentage of individual earnings at the moment of 
take-up of pensions…for an assumed hypothetical worker, who in the so-called „base case‟ 
has a given earnings and career profile (male, earnings of average wage constant over his 
fulltime 40 years career, retiring at 65, etc)”. This approach is also typically used in World 
Bank and OECD studies (see Holzmann & Guven (2009) and OECD (2009)). However, this 
approach is increasingly misleading, as the effect of reforms on full career entitlements tends 
to be weaker than that on those with incomplete careers. Moreover while reforms have cut 
annual pension benefits at retirement, they have also tended to change by a larger margin 
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later pension benefits. This is particularly important when looking at systemic pension 
reforms, such as those in Sweden and Poland – which result in annual pension benefits 
changing automatically with demographic developments. To address these issues, this paper 
uses measures of pension wealth – the value of all prospective pension transfers received 
during retirement – computed for individuals of both genders across the income distribution 
and with more representative careers.  
 The paper has five sections. The first outlines the current role of state pensions in 
Europe.  It then develops the concept of social sustainability and describes how this can be 
assessed using four indicators, all based on pension wealth. The third section applies this 
framework to reforms legislated in ten European countries between the early 1990s and 2008, 
with an overall synthesis presented in section 4. Policy considerations are made in the final 
section.  
 
1. State pensions in Europe and their changing role 
There are significant differences in the design of state pension systems across Europe.
5
 At 
present, the dominant model remains defined benefit – where pensions are defined as some 
fraction of previous income. However, throughout the 1990s several countries shifted to 
defined contribution – where benefits are linked to contributions made and projected 
longevity. In particular, in most of Eastern Europe labour market entrants now depend mostly 
on personal accounts for their main retirement provision.    
 Rather than focusing on institutional features, to understand better how reforms might 
change performance, it might be better to investigate some of the current outcomes of 
pension systems. Most systems have been reformed extensively making it hard to classify 
them using institutional features. For instance, both Sweden and Italy have reformed their 
systems for new workers from defined benefit to defined contribution, but existing pensions 
are still determined by the previous rules. Moreover while design elements can be changed 
frequently, it is much less likely for the outcomes of a pension system to vary considerably in 
the short term. In this light in Figure 1 we categorise European pensions systems focusing on 
three dimensions – state spending, pensioner poverty and the level of income replacement. 
These dimensions encapsulate the two main aims of pension policy: alleviating poverty and 
smoothening income over the lifecycle (see Barr and Diamond (2006)), and the main concern 
of most international institutions: the budgetary impact of pensions. Countries where pension 
spending as a percentage of the national output is higher than the EU average are deemed to 
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be high spenders , and are placed above the horizontal line in the Figure (e.g. Italy), and vice 
versa (e.g. Ireland). Similarly countries where the proportion of elderly with an income below 
the relative poverty threshold is higher than the EU average are placed to the left of the 
vertical line (e.g. Italy), and vice versa (e.g. Sweden). So, for instance, since Poland spends 
more than the EU average on state pensions and the poverty risk among its elderly is below 
the EU average, it is categorised in the upper right quadrant of the Figure. By contrast, 
Ireland, a country with lower-than-average pension spending and higher-than-average risk of 
pensioner poverty, is placed within the lower left quadrant.  
 The other dimension of this pension system categorisation is illustrated by means of a 
darker shading of countries where the relative income ratio of elderly persons is above the 
EU25 average, typically because of a high replacement ratio of pensions. Thus Poland is in 
the darker shaded area, while Ireland is in the lighter shaded one.  Given that countries with 
high relative income ratios tend to have lower-than-average risk-of-poverty and higher-than-
average spending, the darker shading occurs mostly in the upper right quadrant. Some 
countries, which seem to be moving away from their current position in relation to the EU 
average, are placed closer to the intersections of the sets in Figure 1.  
 This process results in the identification of three relatively distinct groups of 
countries.
6
 Group A (e.g. Germany, France, Austria, Poland, Hungary) are characterised by 
high levels of income replacement and low pensioner poverty, but high spending. At the other 
extreme, Group B countries have both low levels of income replacement and high rates of 
pensioner poverty. Countries in this group can be further divided into those with high (e.g. 
Italy) and low levels (e.g. UK) of state pension spending.  Group C (e.g. Sweden, Finland, 
Slovakia) is at an intermediate position, with relatively low levels of spending and low rates 
of relative poverty among pensioners, but also low levels of income replacement in 
retirement.  The importance of this taxonomy is that it helps understand the possible sources 
of system stress – namely high spending in Group A, high poverty in Group B, and low 
replacement in Group C.  Thus, a priori, one might expect that reforms in countries of Group 
A would have focused on curbing expenditure; reforms in countries of Group C to have 
concentrated on improving income replacement; and reforms in countries of Group B to have 
been focused on two aspects: in countries with high spending – the curbing of spending 
followed by measures to tackle poverty and income replacement, and in countries with low 
spending – the expansion of the pension system.       
  
5 
 
 Figure 1: Pension system categorisation 
 
 
 
Note: Groups B and C are both shaded lightly, as countries classified in these groups have low 
replacement rates; while those in Group A have high replacement rates. Countries placed above the 
horizontal line are high spenders on state pensions. Countries placed to the left of the vertical line 
have higher-than-average elderly poverty. The position of the countries in these groups reflects the 
extent to which their level of pension spending, relative income of the elderly and percentage of 
elderly population at risk-of-poverty differs from the EU average. 
 
 
However, many studies of pension reforms in Europe enacted since the 1990s (for 
instance, Whitehouse & Martin (2008), Zaidi & Grech (2007), Hering (2006) and Schneider 
(2009)) argue that the main consideration of reformers was to reduce long-term financial cost 
(and in some cases, especially in Eastern Europe, short-term financial problems and a desire 
to reduce the state‟s role). The impact of reforms on the capability of pension systems to 
achieve their aims has not tended to be given primary importance.   
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Slovenia 
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spending 
Low 
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  2. Defining and measuring pension system sustainability    
 While there is consensus that ageing populations are a challenge for pension systems, 
the achievement of reduced growth in spending cannot be seen as the definitive solution to 
ageing.  As Zaidi (2006) points out “policy-makers need to remember that pensions were not 
introduced by chance”.7  Spending on pensions is but a means to an end – the alleviation of 
poverty and the provision of income replacement during retirement. Howse (2004) argues 
that even if one agrees to the notion that spending on pensions is “already approaching the 
limits of political acceptability and economic efficiency”, this does not mean that the policy 
task is “simply that of ensuring that these limits are not transgressed”. While spending is an 
important constraint, a pension system is not successful just because it involves little 
spending. Rather, a successful system is that which achieves its goals with the least pressure 
on constraints. By adopting a narrow vision of sustainability focused on minimising growth 
in state spending on pensions, policymakers risk failing to take into account potential 
feedback effects on fiscal spending from the impact of reforms on adequacy. Fiscal 
sustainability and pension adequacy are not conflicting aims, but rather two sides of the same 
coin. If pension systems fall short, there could be strong political pressure for higher 
government spending on other support. 
 European Commission (2006) notes that while declining pension generosity can 
contribute positively to fiscal sustainability, “such a decrease may raise concerns about the 
adequacy of public pensions that could translate into pressure for higher public spending”. 
The report also acknowledges that there is no great escape by simply reducing public 
responsibility and recognises that “the risks to public finances will crucially depend on the 
reaction of individuals regarding their future retirement arrangements”. Much in the same 
vein, Holzmann & Hinz (2005) present the revised World Bank position on pension reform 
arguing that pension systems should provide “benefits to the full breadth of the population 
that are sufficient to prevent old-age poverty on a country-specific absolute level in addition 
to providing a reliable means to smooth lifetime consumption for the vast majority of the 
population.” 
  There appear to be four concerns in terms of ensuring pension system sustainability.  
From a political economy perspective, the adequacy of the system for the average voter needs 
to be ensured. If a system is not seen as beneficial by the electoral majority, namely by not 
helping them maintain their pre-retirement living standards, it could be voted out.  Similarly 
if a system is not seen as able to alleviate poverty, the political pressures that led to the 
setting up of social assistance to elderly people during the early part of the twentieth century 
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might re-emerge. In the process of achieving these two goals, policymakers need, however, to 
take into consideration the balance of transfers between different generations. Political 
pressures for reform can arise either because systems are not achieving the goals that 
individuals expect of them or because individuals are unhappy about the deal they are getting 
compared to previous generations.  Individuals can be concerned about the level of taxes they 
pay to finance the system but also by that of their pension transfers compared to previous 
generations. Social sustainability can only be achieved if policymakers understand these 
tradeoffs and optimise pension systems in this light, in the presence on considerable 
uncertainty, particularly as regards economic growth and longevity.  
  By contrast, most evaluations of pension reform tend to focus only on a single aspect. 
Most commonly, the focus is concentrated on pension spending projections. For instance 
Schneider (2009) argues that “the larger the decrease in expected spending on public 
pensions in 2050 between two base years, the more successful a pension reform the country 
achieved”. Eckardt (2005) argues that this, in part, reflects the lack of consensus on what 
constitutes the most appropriate pension adequacy indicator. However recently international 
institutions, such as the EU, OECD and World Bank, (see respectively, European 
Commission (2012), Martin & Whitehouse (2008) and Holzmann & Guven (2009)) have 
focused on the effect of reforms on theoretical replacement rates for full-career individuals on 
average earnings. The latter have been widely used as measures of adequacy. However, they 
suffer from a number of important deficiencies, such as being single point-in-time 
comparisons and failing to capture the impact of changes in longevity. OECD (2005), for 
example, notes that a country with low life expectancy could „afford‟ to pay higher 
replacement rates to its citizens while imposing the same contribution on workers as a 
country with higher life expectancy but with lower replacement rates, and that a country 
where pensions lose their relative value over time, could „afford‟ to pay a higher replacement 
rate at retirement than one where the relative value remains constant throughout retirement. 
Similarly the full impact of longevity cannot be discerned by looking at single year 
projections of pension spending.  Moreover spending projections and theoretical replacement 
rates have tended to be computed separately and in many cases, trends cannot be reconciled. 
For instance the average pension benefit underpinning the EU‟s pension spending projections 
amounts to 40% of gross wages, as against the average 62% gross replacement rate used in 
the EU‟s pension adequacy reports.                        
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  An alternative approach is to evaluate the impact of reforms on pension wealth.  The 
latter is the discounted stream of future pension payments during retirement, weighted by the 
probability that the individual will still be alive at that particular age (see Feldstein (1974) 
and Brugiavini et al (2005)). This measure captures the total pension transfer to an individual 
and contrary to replacement rates (which only measure generosity at a particular point in 
time), it captures the effects of benefit indexation post-retirement and of longevity. 
Sutherland et al (2009) documents how changes in benefit indexation have reduced the 
generosity of the UK welfare system. Estimates of replacement rates made in European 
Commission (2012) suggest that over the first ten years of retirement the value of pension 
benefits (for someone with a full career on the average wage) declines by about a tenth of its 
original value. Pension wealth can therefore be used to assess whether pension systems 
provide transfers that would result in individuals, on average, having an annual income that 
keeps them out of relative poverty during retirement, and also to calculate more accurately 
the degree of consumption smoothing that pension systems allow.  By comparing the pension 
wealth of two successive generations one can also arrive at an intuitive measure of 
intergenerational balance. Moreover, in conjunction with demographic and labour market 
data, pension wealth can be used to assess the long-term contribution rate needed to keep the 
pension system in financial balance across generations.  This is a better measure of financial 
sustainability than focusing on projected spending on pensions in one particular year as it 
takes into account the fact that longer-lived generations will require this spending for more 
years.   
 As an empirical application of this framework, we estimate measures of pension 
wealth in 2005 and 2050 for hypothetical individuals under pre- and post-reform systems 
using the OECD‟s APEX cross-country pension entitlement model.8 In contrast with studies 
which just look at average male earners (such as European Commission (2012) and OECD 
(2009)), we look at nine hypothetical individuals for each gender working full-time but at the 
different deciles of the wage distribution in each country,
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 together with a hypothetical part-
time worker (earning the median part-time wage) and an individual on minimum pension 
provision for each gender. Looking at different individuals is important as many pension 
systems are non-linear, and one cannot discern the poverty alleviation function of pensions by 
looking at average male earners. The presence of substantial gender and income pension 
inequality is well-covered in the literature (see for instance, Bardasi & Jenkins (2002), Evans 
et al (2000), Ginn & Arber (2001), and Meyer & Pfau-Effinger (2006)). Note that our cases 
differ just by gender and their position in the wage distribution. Some studies (such as 
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Bridgen & Meyer (2008)) have also incorporated other differences, such as child care 
responsibilities.              
 Pension wealth estimates were estimated for ten countries. The latter, namely Austria, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK, not only 
cover 70% of the EU‟s population, but also span the four different pension typologies 
developed in Section 1 of this paper and include examples of various types of reforms. The 
reforms modelled were introduced between the early 1990s and 2008. These do not consider 
later legislated or proposed pension reforms, such as the more recent changes to pension ages 
in the UK and France and the reforms carried out in Hungary in the wake of the financial 
crisis, which could result in much lower generosity than envisaged in this paper. The 
benchmark for comparison was taken to be the situation in 2005 – when the pensioner 
generation was retiring under the pre-reform systems. By 2050, individuals are assumed to 
retire under the post-reform systems, while living longer lives. Having such a long horizon 
may seem somewhat naive as pension systems are unlikely to remain unchanged till then. 
However this is the horizon used in EU pension policy discussions, with which the results of 
this paper are intended to compare.     
 Pension wealth estimates were used to calculate four social sustainability indicators, 
on a pre- and post-reform basis, as follows: 
a) Achievement of System Goals  
 Strength of Poverty alleviation function = Pension wealth is averaged over the 
retirement period and expressed as a percentage of national disposable income in each 
year (approximating the relative poverty threshold achievable by these transfers).  In 
this case we looked only at hypothetical individuals of each gender with below-
median wages (as these are most likely to be at-risk-of-poverty), and computed the 
weighted average of poverty thresholds achieved (with the weights dependent on the 
relative size of that group out of the total working age population).  
 Strength of Consumption Smoothing function = The annual average pension transfer 
implied by pension wealth is compared to pre-retirement wages, and averaged over 
retirement. The ratio is calculated for all employed hypothetical individuals and then a 
weighted average (dependent on the relative size of that group out of the total 
employed) is taken as the aggregate indicator for that country. 
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b) Pressure on System Constraints 
 Intergenerational Balance = The (weighted average for all hypothetical individuals) 
pension wealth, defined in terms of the contemporary average wage, of the 2050 
pensioner generation is compared with that of the 2005 generation.  
 Financial Sustainability = The contribution rate out of lifetime median wages 
required to pay the aggregate pension transfers of the 2005 and 2050 pensioner 
generations is computed by multiplying the weighted average gross pension wealth 
for all hypothetical individuals in a generation by the ratio of beneficiaries to 
contributors, and dividing this by average career length at the time.   
 In our modelling we assumed that there is full take-up of minimum pensions and that 
no private retirement saving is taking place – strong assumptions for countries with means-
testing and significant private pension saving as take-up of benefits and the level of savings 
clearly affect state entitlements. Moreover our modelling skirted the issue of household 
formation and calculated entitlements to single individuals, ignoring entitlements arising 
from partners. The estimates also ignore the effects on entitlements of credits provided for 
non-contributory periods – such as unemployment and childcare. These two simplifications 
can affect significantly results – especially for women. Finally, the indicators presented here 
assume pension wealth is transferred equally throughout retirement. In practice, transfers tend 
to be higher during the earlier part of retirement.    
 The main contribution of this analysis lies in four methodological innovations. Firstly, 
by using pension wealth, it captures the impact of two elements, namely longevity and 
indexation rules. The second innovation is the explicit use of benchmarks against which to 
assess pension entitlements. Most frequently policy makers have not sought to look at 
benchmarks in this area, preferring to retain a good level of discretion on what constitute 
„adequate‟ outcomes. While the benchmarks used here can be seen as arbitrary, the 
framework is flexible enough to allow the testing of various outcomes. The third innovation 
is to attempt to measure all elements using the same indicators instead of using different 
models.  This increases transparency and also clearly illustrates the trade-offs between system 
goals and constraints. Finally this framework is able to incorporate distributional and gender 
analysis – an element of pension reform assessment that has frequently not been given 
enough importance by international institutions.  
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3. Applying empirically the pension system sustainability framework 
 The assumption of complete careers till pension age over-represents the real efficacy 
of existing pension systems, by over-estimating the achievement of goals, since it implies that 
individuals benefit from the maximum generosity of the system, while diminishing the 
constraints faced, as it boosts the support ratio (as everyone is assumed to be in work).  
Moreover, reformers may have based their policy choices on the understanding that there 
would be developments in the labour market which would offset part of the effects of their 
reforms. To understand whether pension reforms are socially sustainable, one needs to adopt 
more representative labour market assumptions.   
 This paper presents two sets of sustainability indictors. In the first set – the “full-
careers” assumption – we focus on just the nine hypothetical full-time individuals of each 
gender and assume that they work from age 20 to the state pension age in their country. We 
also assume that everyone of working age is in employment. In the second set – the “actual 
careers” assumption – we look at all eleven cases (thus including the representative part-time 
worker and the person on minimum provision in addition to the nine full-timers). Moreover 
instead of assuming full-careers for those in employment, estimates of the number of years 
spent in the labour market were constructed using EU LFS current and projected participation 
rates by age (taken from European Commission (2012)). For instance, if the participation rate 
of those aged 20 is 80%, we add 0.8 career years, and continue to cumulate this career length 
till pension age with age-specific participation rates in that country. Note that in this approach 
we are imposing the average labour market participation of a cross-section of generations on 
a single generation, and we are assuming that all our individuals display average labour 
market participation trends over their career. Despite these significant caveats, these 
estimates should present a more realistic view of the present and future efficacy of pension 
systems being studied, as current and projected labour participation rates, particularly among 
women, differ greatly among the ten countries.
10
 The aggregate results for the four 
sustainability indicators are presented for both the “full-careers” and “actual-careers” 
assumption in Tables 1 to 4, below.    
 Our estimates suggest that while reforms have reduced the poverty alleviation and 
consumption smoothing functions in nearly all countries, generosity remains high in many 
countries, with pension transfers keeping most of those below median earnings above the 
60% relative poverty threshold, on average, throughout retirement.  Reforms have mostly 
followed existing system goals, but with an eye to reduce future cost.  However there have 
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been some reforms, mostly in Eastern Europe, which raise issues about the future adequacy 
of pensions for women and those on lower incomes as the degree of progressiveness has been 
reduced considerably. The “actual careers” estimates confirm the importance of 
understanding the interaction between the labour market and the social protection system. A 
system may look very generous on paper, but not be so in reality as only few individuals 
qualify for full benefits.   
  
Table 1: The poverty thresholds (% of median disposable income) achievable in 2005 and 
2050 under different labour market assumptions   
 
a) Men  
 Full-careers assumption^ Actual-careers assumption* 
 2005 2050 Change in p.p. 2005 2050 Change in p.p. 
Austria 96 85 -11 95 74 -21 
Finland 79 72 -7 64 66 +2 
France 73 62 -11 63 59 -4 
Germany 69 58 -11 61 59 -2 
Hungary 79 82 +3 70 65 -5 
Italy 99 78 -21 95 68 -27 
Poland 77 54 -23 66 50 -16 
Slovakia 102 77 -25 93 51 -42 
Sweden 72 64 -8 70 65 -5 
UK 48 61 +13 46 59 +13 
 
b) Women  
 Full-careers assumption^ Actual-careers assumption* 
 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
Austria 69 70 +1 68 61 -7 
Finland 70 64 -6 57 58 +1 
France 67 59 -8 44 59 +15 
Germany 55 52 -3 48 56 +8 
Hungary 73 79 +6 68 59 -9 
Italy 79 71 -8 68 50 -18 
Poland 68 39 -29 55 35 -20 
Slovakia 82 62 -20 74 41 -33 
Sweden 60 54 -6 59 56 -3 
UK 41 60 +19 39 56 +17 
^ These indicators are the average for the 4 hypothetical full-timer full-career workers with below-
median wages.  
* These indicators are the weighted averages for 4 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers with below-
median wages and the hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time 
and part-time workforce in each country.  
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
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This tends to be particularly pertinent for women.  The “full-career estimates” of the 
strength of the poverty alleviation function are far higher than those resulting when adopting 
more realistic labour market assumptions (see Table 1). For instance, the relative poverty 
threshold achievable by pension transfers in France drops to 63% from 73% among men and 
from 67% to 44% among women. Overall, the “actual-careers” results are more in line with 
current data on the actual risk-of-poverty and gender gaps in poverty risks. For example, 
under the “full-careers” assumption, Italian women are among the best provided for across 
Europe, failing to explain their high relative poverty rate. The “actual-careers” estimates 
appear to be much more representative of effective pension generosity.  
 While these are important contributions, potentially the most interesting finding is that 
labour market trends can act as a countervailing force that offsets in part pension reforms. 
This is particularly true in those countries where the reforms created closer links between 
contributions and benefits. Reforms, generally speaking, reduce the strength of the poverty 
alleviation function and result in a greater degree of convergence across countries. If one 
were to look at “full-careers”, reforms make systems more generous only in the UK and in 
Hungary. However taking into account actual and projected labour participation shows us a 
different picture. Effective generosity is set to improve in some countries, like France and 
Germany – on account of higher labour market participation. Thus the “full-careers” 
estimates show women as being the main losers of the reforms, with very substantial losses 
anticipated, for instance, among women in Poland and Slovakia. The “actual-careers” 
assumption reverses this finding for some countries, though it should be noted not for those 
countries with the strongest losses. Higher labour participation might actually result in 
improvements over time in pension entitlements for women despite the reforms, cases in 
point being France and Germany. Moreover in many countries, cuts in the general pension 
system‟s generosity have been complemented by a strengthening of minimum pensions. This 
has the potential to reduce the impact of the reforms on pensioner poverty.   
 There are similar trends when one looks at average replacement ratios – i.e. the 
strength of the consumption smoothing function. For instance, Table 2 shows that in 
Germany the average replacement ratio for men with a full career will be more than a sixth 
lower by 2050; and a fifth lower in Italy. The loss here is however relatively stronger and in 
countries like Poland, Austria and Italy the state pension on its own will not be enough to 
sustain pre-retirement levels of consumption. Again the decline here is much pronounced for 
men. Gender gaps in replacement rates should decline, as men (with their fuller contributory 
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records) will lose more in actual entitlements than women. This can be discerned by 
comparing the “full-careers” with the “actual-careers” cases – in some cases, e.g. Italy and 
Slovakia, the reforms favour those with full careers.  However in many cases, the impact of 
the reforms on replacement rates differs by income; for those on high incomes generosity has 
been cut, while for those on low incomes it was maintained stable. In many countries, the 
consumption smoothing function of the state pension system for middle-to-high earners may 
need to be supplemented by other means.  But there are exceptions – in Poland and Slovakia 
those on low incomes face the toughest challenge as systems are much less progressive.     
 
Table 2: The average replacement ratios through retirement (% of pre-retirement wages) 
achievable in 2005 and 2050 under different labour market assumptions 
 
a) Men  
 Full-careers assumption^ Actual-careers assumption* 
 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
Austria 91 78 -13 89 66 -23 
Finland 75 69 -6 59 59 0 
France 68 57 -11 56 58 +2 
Germany 85 68 -17 71 69 -2 
Hungary 85 90 +5 74 62 -12 
Italy 92 72 -20 92 67 -25 
Poland 87 63 -24 67 56 -11 
Slovakia 72 67 -5 62 56 -6 
Sweden 66 62 -4 66 59 -7 
UK 40 48 +8 37 53 +16 
 
b) Women  
 Full-careers assumption^ Actual-careers assumption* 
 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
Austria 83 82 -1 75 66 -9 
Finland 75 70 -5 58 60 +2 
France 71 61 -10 41 51 +10 
Germany 82 71 -11 59 67 +8 
Hungary 83 90 +7 74 64 -10 
Italy 82 73 -9 65 50 -15 
Poland 86 50 -36 65 43 -22 
Slovakia 83 67 -16 75 56 -19 
Sweden 71 64 -7 66 57 -9 
UK 44 60 +16 40 57 +17 
^ These indicators are the averages for the 9 hypothetical full-timer full-career workers.  
* These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and part-time workforce. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
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Turning to pressures on constraints, our estimates suggest that had replacement ratios 
remained untouched by reforms, future generations of pensioners would have got much larger 
net pension transfers as a result of increasing longevity. The reforms appear to have 
addressed this.  So while year-on-year replacement rates may have fallen, generally, future 
pensioners still get more transfers than current ones, with the exception of Italy, Poland and 
Slovakia. In these countries the drop is quite significant and reflects the large financial 
problems which these countries would have faced had they retained their previous system 
rules. Table 3 indicates that the consideration of labour market participation does not result in 
any significant reinterpretation of the development of the relative size of intergenerational 
pension transfers. Rising labour participation and increasing longevity should result in net 
pension wealth expanding slightly in many countries. Interestingly while under “full-careers”, 
women generally lose out compared to men, on account of the equalisation of pension ages, 
the “actual-careers” assumption shows them in some countries, such as France and Germany, 
as being better off as their entitlements are buoyed by their rising labour participation.  
Table 3: The net pension wealth of the 2050 generation compared to that of the 2005 
generation under different labour market assumptions (%)  
 Male Female 
 
Full-careers 
assumption^ 
Actual-careers 
assumption* 
Full-careers 
assumption^ 
Actual-careers 
assumption* 
Austria 109 94 98 87 
Finland 114 125 106 119 
France 98 101 96 141 
Germany 92 104 95 124 
Hungary 131 116 112 82 
Italy 95 77 87 76 
Poland 106 83 69 73 
Slovakia 109 80 79 58 
Sweden 107 112 100 96 
UK 127 127 112 117 
^ These indicators are the averages for the 9 hypothetical full-timer full-career workers.  
* These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the share of full- and part-time workforce in each 
country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 In Table 4 we present estimates of the contribution rates workers in 2005 and 2050 
would need to pay to finance the pension transfers to the pensioner cohorts retiring in those 
years.  For 2050, the financing cost is presented both for the reformed pension systems and 
also assuming no reforms had taken place (so that system rules remained as at 2005). While 
generosity is lower under the “actual careers” assumption, the financing requirements of 
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pension systems are significantly higher. On average, across Europe a contribution rate of 
17% is required to finance the pension wealth of the currently retired as against the 11% 
implied when modelling full-careers. In the absence of reforms, fiscal pressures would have 
increased substantially more. The impact of the ageing transition, in fact, would be 
compounded by the impact of increasing women‟s entitlement to pensions. The reforms, 
however, partially address this factor so that the increase in fiscal pressures by 2050 is of 
around 10 percentage points, on average. There are some notable outliers, however, such as 
France, Poland and Slovakia, where the required increase is around double this increase. In 
these countries, weak labour market participation combines with rapid ageing to make up a 
very dangerous cocktail.  The trends implied by the estimates in Table 4 differ from standard 
assessments of pension spending projections, as they suggest that despite reforms the 
financing burden of pension systems will still increase very significantly (by contrast, 
Economic Policy Committee (2009) suggests pension spending across the EU will rise by just 
2.4% of GDP by 2060).  This is because our measure captures better the full implications of 
longevity increases, by looking at pension spending for the whole retirement period of a 
cohort, rather than focusing on one year of future spending. 
Table 4: Comparing financial sustainability under the different careers assumptions* 
 
 
Full-careers assumption Actual-careers assumption 
 2005 
Pre-reform 
2050 
Post-reform 
2050  2005 
Pre-reform 
2050 
Post-reform 
2050 
Austria 13.8 27.3 22.7 19.3 47.7 26.8 
Finland 8.5 20.4 18.3 8.7 23.7 20.9 
France 14.6 29.6 24.3 21.0 50.3 41.4 
Germany 8.0 17.9 14.4 11.8 39.6 20.9 
Hungary 22.0 43.0 30.8 37.7 80.9 44.5 
Italy 17.3 34.1 24.7 29.7 67.1 31.6 
Poland 8.4 30.4 20.7 14.4 67.7 34.7 
Slovakia 11.1 35.9 24.6 20.6 85.4 38.7 
Sweden 10.1 18.3 16.7 11.5 30.4 21.5 
UK 5.8 7.1 6.7 9.1 17.6 10.3 
Average^  11.1 23.6 18.3 17.5 47.2 27.2 
* The proportion of total lifetime wages needed to finance the pension wealth of different generations.   
^ The contribution rate of a country is weighted in line with relative population size.    
Source: Own estimates using APEX, EU labour market and population projections. 
 
4. Overall assessment of social sustainability of pension reforms  
 The achievement of “sustainability” has been the main objective that policymakers 
have set themselves when reforming pension systems. However when looking into the future, 
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policymakers need to reassure themselves not only that pressure on constraints is being 
managed properly, but also that pension systems remain effective and still achieve expected 
goals. To do this, policymakers need to be able to map out the impact of reforms on the 
strength of the poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing functions, particularly for 
groups with low incomes and/or partial careers, together with the influence reforms have on 
relative size of transfers between generations, both in terms of the pension wealth accruing to 
future generations and the contribution rates required to finance these transfers. 
 By looking holistically at the developments in the four social sustainability indicators 
described in the previous section, policymakers could compare how the achievement of the 
twin goals of pension systems and the pressure on system constraints should change by 2050 
when looking across the aggregate pensioner population. This approach allows one to 
understand whether one aim is being sacrificed for better results on the other, and provides an 
indication of how the role and scope of state pension systems could evolve. The fact that this 
comparison is done on a cross-country basis also allows one to understand how different 
policymakers reacted to similar challenges. There are some quite striking similarities. For 
instance, only countries which faced a very substantial fiscal challenge due to ageing put in 
place reforms that cut the relative size of total pension transfers to future generations. In most 
countries, the reforms offset only part of the effect on pension wealth of the projected rise in 
longevity, and accommodate the projected change in the relative size in the pensioner 
population by a rising (implied) contribution rate.  
 The estimates in Table 1 suggest that most countries will converge towards providing 
pension wealth which keeps individuals above the 60% poverty threshold throughout 
retirement. The only exceptions appear to be Poland and Slovakia. Despite these radical cuts, 
these countries will still experience large increases in their financing costs (see Table 4), on 
account of steeply declining support ratios. Improving employment rates could help stem 
these developments. In a similar vein, in France and Hungary the pension system seems to 
face significant fiscal challenges, which could be partially addressed by increasing 
employment at older ages and raising the pension age – options which these two countries 
have started to address though recent reforms not modelled here.    
The above analysis can be deepened by looking more closely at the social 
sustainability indicators, and zooming to particular sections of the population. For instance, 
the estimates presented in the previous section suggest very different gender and income 
distribution effects of pension reforms in Poland compared to the UK.  The impact of the 
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pension reforms in Poland will be more strongly felt by those on low incomes, and 
particularly women. By contrast in the UK, the reforms are very progressive. Our social 
sustainability indicators help set out the major risks faced by pension systems. They show 
that in some countries, like Poland and Slovakia, pensioner poverty could become an issue, 
while in others future pensioner generations may be seen to be favoured at the expense of 
current pensioner generations (e.g. Finland, UK) and/or future generations of workers (e.g. 
France).    
The estimates can help us try to assess how the taxonomy depicted in Figure 1 might 
change by 2050 as a result of reforms. The overall situation in 2050 will be very different 
than in 2005, as can be inferred from the averages for the four indicators shown in Tables 1 to 
4.  In particular, the level of pension spending, on average, will be significantly higher, there 
will be more convergence across countries in terms of replacement rates and the risk-of-
poverty among pensioners could be higher than in Figure 1.  
 The projected changes in the social sustainability indicators suggest that while there 
will still be three general groups of countries (Group A – systems with high levels of income 
replacement and low pensioner poverty, but high spending, Group B – systems with high or 
low spending, but low replacement rates and high pensioner poverty, and Group C – systems 
with low spending, low replacement rates and low pensioner poverty); the composition of the 
groups could change significantly. For instance, Poland and Slovakia could join Italy in 
Group B, as their level of pensioner poverty could be negatively affected by the reforms they 
have put in place, while at the same time their lower labour participation combined with 
ageing will result in a substantial increase in financing costs. Group B will, however, 
probably lose one member, the UK. By focusing resources even more on those on low 
incomes and women, the UK pension system should make inroads on pensioner poverty 
while maintaining spending low on account of the planned increase in pension age. The UK 
could join the Scandinavian duo, Finland and Sweden, but their level of pension spending 
will increase, rising to levels which in 2005 characterised high-spending countries. In Group 
A, besides the movement of Poland, Hungary could be moving towards Group B, as the 
reforms leave some groups at-risk-of-poverty.  
 The position of Austria, Germany and France may also change, as they move closer to 
Group C in terms of the replacement rates they provide. One could argue that France will 
separate from the other two, as it faces much higher projected increases in spending, and join 
Hungary, but at the same time the French system appears to have a much more effective 
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poverty alleviation function than the Hungarian one.  The only country that might still be in 
the same place it occupies today is Italy. While the reforms mean that it will be less of an 
outlier in spending terms, low labour participation among older workers and women, together 
with lack of pension protection for the unemployed could keep pensioner poverty levels high 
while the reforms have cut the replacement rates individuals can look forward to in 2050.   
5. Policy considerations 
After having applied our social sustainability assessment framework empirically, we 
can now proceed to make some policy considerations.  Two questions appear to be 
particularly relevant – namely the possibility that changes in economic behaviour could 
accommodate changes in pension generosity; and the resilience of pension systems to shocks.   
One of the main hopes of policymakers is that any negative impacts of pension 
reforms on retirement income can be undone by means of additional private saving. In fact, 
the standard solution offered by the World Bank to reforming countries was to introduce 
mandatory private pensions. While this may be feasible for those on medium- to high-
incomes, it is less likely for those with low-incomes. In Table 5 we show that in many 
countries these individuals would need to save relatively high amounts in order to generate 
the same average replacement rates throughout retirement as in 2005, even if they accept the 
reduction in pension wealth due to higher pension ages. Moreover, notably in Poland and 
Slovakia, this task is made more difficult by the fact that individuals will also be called upon 
to pay higher contribution rates to pay for contemporary pension transfers. Longer working 
lives present a more likely way of maintaining consumption smoothing. Table 2 showed how 
different the change in replacement rates, on average, would be under different career 
lengths. This confirms that reforms place a significant disincentive for individuals to maintain 
the same career length as in 2005.  By contrast, longer careers undo a significant part of the 
reduction in generosity, except in countries which currently have above-average replacement 
rates. In the latter cases, policymakers appear to have concentrated on reducing costs. 
 Labour market participation also plays a large part in ensuring the resilience of 
pension systems to shocks. Different longevity assumptions have significant impacts on the 
sustainability indicators, particularly for those countries which have not adopted features in 
their pension systems which automatically take into account improvements in life 
expectancy. Longevity increases the length of retirement, and tends to reduce overall 
generosity as pensions in payment tend to lose value relative to average earnings over time.  
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The resilience of the poverty alleviation function to higher longevity is very dependent on the 
generosity of minimum pensions (e.g. pensioners in Sweden and Italy are better protected 
than those in Poland), while that of consumption smoothing is linked to the length of working 
lives, particularly in systems which have linked closer contributions and benefits.  As for the 
pressure on constraints, longevity shocks inevitably result in stronger impacts, though the UK 
with its relatively modest and increasingly flat pension system is also not that much affected 
by higher longevity. By contrast the estimates shown in Table 4 suggest that the French 
system appears to be one of the systems which would gain the most if working lives were to 
rise closer to the full-careers assumption 
 
Table 5: Additional saving (% of wages) to maintain consumption smoothing (actual-careers 
case) unchanged between 2005 and 2050 (assumed net nominal rate of return: 5.5%) 
a) Men 
 10th 
Decile 
20
th
 
Decile 
30th 
Decile 
40
th
 
Decile 
50th 
Decile 
60
th
 
Decile 
70th 
Decile 
80th 
Decile 
90th 
Decile 
Part-
time 
Austria 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.7 8.0 8.5 9.2 8.0 8.7 
Finland           
France   2.6 4.8 4.8 4.6 5.1 4.7 4.0 5.1 
Germany  0.6 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.3 3.0 4.0 1.4 
Hungary 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3     
Italy 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.5 13.7 13.9 13.9 13.6 13.2 13.6 
Poland 8.9 7.2 6.3 4.7 4.3 3.7 2.8 1.8 0.6 6.4 
Slovakia  12.6 12.9 13.1 13 11.5 7.5 3.6   12.9 
Sweden 3.4 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7    
UK           
 
b) Women 
 10th 
Decile 
20
th
 
Decile 
30th 
Decile 
40
th
 
Decile 
50th 
Decile 
60th 
Decile 
70th 
Decile 
80th 
Decile 
90th 
Decile 
Part-
time 
Austria 2.2 3.8 4.0 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.8 3.3 
Finland           
France           
Germany        0.2 1.0  
Hungary 7.8 5.3 6.8 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.3 5.9 5.6 6.0 
Italy 6.3 5.2 6.2 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.3 6.4 5.8 
Poland 15.4 14.6 13 12.5 11.9 11 9.7 8.3 6.7 12.6 
Slovakia  17.7 18.2 18.5 18.7 18.9 18.9 19.0 16.3 6.6 18.7 
Sweden 5.0 5.1 4.4 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.7 4.0 0.7 3.9 
UK           
Note: In cases where consumption smoothing will be higher in 2050, no estimates are made. 
Source: Own workings using APEX. 
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Conclusion 
 The social sustainability framework developed in this paper tries to assess in an 
internally consistent and holistic way what pensions systems achieve and at what cost.  The 
approach of many assessments of pension reforms of just looking at one part of the phrase – 
„at what cost‟ – is counterintuitive.  Rather policymakers need to focus on what realistically 
systems can achieve, and act in a way as to change individual behaviour to accommodate 
changes in public provision.  
 Many assessments of reforms, especially those of international institutions, such as 
the EU and the World Bank, have adopted point-of-retirement indicators and concluded that 
reforms have reduced greatly pension transfers to future generations and addressed large part 
of the fiscal impact of ageing. The analysis presented in this paper changes somewhat these 
conclusions, showing that while most governments have sought to reduce the future burden 
on taxpayers, increasing longevity means that the relative size of pension transfers will 
remain broadly similar – except in countries with very large projected spending (where 
policymakers have made more aggressive cuts). Looking at projected levels of pension 
wealth also indicates that some systems remain very vulnerable to longevity shocks.  
 Similarly our estimates show that the focus on modelling “full-careers” can be 
deceptive, particularly when looking at reforms which have tightened links between benefits 
and contributions. For instance, in Slovakia the poverty threshold achievable by pension 
transfers to low-income individuals could nearly halve when considering projected labour 
participation. The “full-careers” assumption, by contrast, implies a drop of just a fifth.  Rising 
labour participation in many cases can help undo a lot of the cuts in system generosity.  The 
analysis in this paper, however, suggests that pensioner poverty may once again re-emerge as 
an important issue in some countries where at present its low level does not attract much 
political attention. Moreover in some cases, such in Eastern European countries, moves to 
link benefits with contributions may have serious gender equality implications.  
 The social sustainability framework developed in this paper confirms that in many 
cases, there remains more to be done to address the financial requirements brought by the 
rapid ageing of Europe‟s population. It shows that when pressed, policymakers, particularly 
in Western Europe, were more willing to sacrifice the income smoothing function of pensions 
rather than poverty alleviation.  This is a decision that makes considerable sense as middle- to 
high-income individuals are possibly in a better position to accommodate the effect of state 
pension reforms by increasing their private saving.  However in some cases, notably in 
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Eastern Europe, results suggest that policymakers may not have fully considered the full 
impact of their policies on those on low incomes, on those with incomplete careers and on 
women.  The required increase in private saving combined with the additional contributions 
required to finance public pensions appears to be too hefty for those on low incomes.      
 By contrast, policymakers who have focused on extending working lives (partly by 
increasing pension ages) appear to be in a better position to maintain the effectiveness of their 
pension system. Decreasing pension wealth through reductions in generosity appears to create 
more risks to sustainability than decreasing pension wealth by raising entitlement ages.  By 
maintaining the proportion of life spent in retirement unchanged across generations, 
policymakers would be better able to achieve similar system aims as under current systems, 
while minimising the required increase in future financing requirements. 
 If tackled in a socially sustainable way, pension reform need not be as tortuous a 
process as it has been over the last decades. If policymakers agree on the aims they want their 
pension systems to achieve, and have the good sense to get political acceptance or at least 
make sure citizens are well informed of these aims, they will be able to set in place reforms 
that stand the test of time. The framework developed here presents one way in which 
policymakers can determine how best to structure their reforms. It shows the interaction 
between the achievement of system goals and pressure on system constraints, and is able to 
shed light on the effects of reforms on all groups of society. Pension systems have proven to 
be one of the most treasured social constructs of the twentieth century. There is little reason 
why they should not remain so also during the twenty-first century, if policymakers make the 
necessary modifications to assure their social sustainability. 
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Endnotes 
                                               
1
 The World Bank was an early advocate of this limited concept of sustainability, described in 
World Bank (1994). It was espoused in many studies; see for instance Disney (2000) and 
Schneider (2009), and features prominently in policy discussions. 
2
 There already have been some policy reversals. For instance, in the UK, recent 
administrations have reversed prime elements of 1980s pension policy such as price uprating 
of the Basis State pension and contracting-out of the State Second pension. Taylor-Gooby 
(1999) singled out the 1980s reforms as “puzzling” as they “damage the interests of 
substantial numbers of the more vulnerable pensioners who are least attractive to commercial 
providers”, concluding they were prone to be reversed. Similarly Barrientos (2006) notes that 
reforms removed the poverty reduction element of many Latin American systems, despite 
widespread elderly poverty. Recently some countries, like Chile, are re-introducing these 
elements.   
3
 The focus on projected spending has been criticised by many (see Barr & Diamond (2008), 
de Deken (2002), Modigliani & Muralidhar (2005), Muller (2002), and Orzsag & Stiglitz 
(1999)). Empirical evidence is also showing that this focus might have led to new policy 
issues. For instance, Forster & Mira D‟Ercole (2005) conclude that “changes in the 
generosity of public transfers and taxes have played the largest role in shaping changes in 
poverty risks among the elderly within individual countries” of the OECD during the second 
half of the 1990s.    
4
 For instance Fultz & Steinhilber (2003), Frericks et al (2006) and Sefton et al (2011) note 
that reforms tend to disadvantage women, as they penalise having partial careers. Bottazzi et 
al (2006), looking at Italy, show how younger cohorts are affected disproportionately by 
pension changes, while Dusek & Kopecsni (2008), focusing on Hungary and Slovakia, 
indicate reforms will hit those with low education, while increasing generosity for those with 
higher education.  
5
 The approach of using institutional features to classify different pension systems is common 
in the literature (see for instance Bonoli (1997), Ferrera (1996) and Natali (2004)).  
6
 The practise of clustering welfare systems using quantitative indicators is found in the 
literature, though not that much in respect of pensions (see Castles & Mitchell (1993), 
Menahem (2007), and Soede et al (2004)).    
7
 See Ove Moene & Wallerstein (2003) for a discussion of why public pensions were set up – 
namely whether they represent a struggle for redistribution or a desire to have protection 
against particular risks. 
8
 The APEX (Analysis of Pension Entitlements across countries) model was originally 
developed by Axia Economics, with the help of funding from the OECD and the World 
Bank. The model codes detailed eligibility and benefit rules for mandatory pension schemes 
based on available public information that has been verified by country contacts. It provides 
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most of the results reviewed in the OECD‟s „Pensions at a Glance‟ publication, the World 
Bank‟s „Pensions Panorama‟ and the EU‟s Pension Adequacy reports.  
9
 This wage distribution (for workers in the private sector excluding farming and fishing) was 
derived from Eurostat‟s Structure of Earnings Survey. 
10
 For details on the assumed contribution years used in the “actual-careers” scenario, see 
Grech (2012).  
